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This paper assesses the claim the the US faces an impending labor shortage due to the impending retirement
of baby boomers and slow growth of the US work force, and that the country should orient labor market
and educational policies to alleviate this prospective shortage. I find that this analysis is flawed, by
making growth of GDP the target of economic policy and by paying inadequate attention to the huge
supply of qualified low wage workers in the global economy. My analysis shows that the projections
of future demands for skills lack the reliability to guide policies on skill development, and that contrary
to the assumption implicit in the shortage analyses, demographic changes have not historically been
consistently associated with changes in labor market conditions. I argue that if there is to be a shortage,
the country should allow the competitive market to raise labor compensation rather than to adopt policies
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  The sky is falling down, the sky is falling down ... 
  I must go and tell the king ... 
  A great labor shortage is coming. 
 
  In the early 2000s, the business press and media began reporting that the US labor market 
was on the verge of a major transformation.  The retirement of baby boomers and slow projected 
growth of the labor force were going to create a great labor shortage.  Policy-makers should 
forget about the sluggish real wage growth of the past three decades, the deterioration in 
pensions and employer provided health care, the “jobless” recovery from the 2001 recession, and 
fears of job loss from off shoring or low wage imports and focus on helping business find 
workers in the coming shortage.  
  The Hudson Institute’s report Beyond Workforce 2020 (Judy and D’Amico, 1997) was 
one of the earliest studies to express concern about the possible future shortage of labor, due to 
predicted reductions in the growth of labor supply due to the retirement of the baby boom 
generation and slackened population growth.  Many other groups interpreted government 
projections of future labor supplies and employment in a similar manner.  The National 
Association of Manufacturing warned employers that a gap of 5.3 million skilled workers would 
develop by 2010 and expand to 21 million by 2020 (NAM, 2003).  The Chamber of Commerce’s 
2006 State of American Business Report declared that “We are staring right in the face of a 
severe worker shortage as 77 million baby boomers prepare to retire in the next few years— with 
a fewer number of younger workers available to replace them.” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
2006, p 13).   According to Public Power, the magazine for the electrical utility industry “The 
coming labor shortage could become the most significant problem the electrical utility industry 
will face.  BLS estimates shortage of 12 million skilled workers by 2010 and 20 million by   2 
2020” (Atkinson, Public Power, 2005). Reporting the consensus from the Aspen Institute’s 
Domestic Strategy Group, David Ellwood wrote that: "CEOs, labor leaders, community leaders, 
all came to the unanimous conclusion that we will have a worker gap that is a very serious one.“ 
(cited by Overholt, 2004) 
  Time Magazine gave the projected labor shortage a positive spin for workers, calling it 
The Coming Job: “The help-wanted ads may look thin — but thanks to aging baby boomers, 
that' s about to change” (Eisenberg, Time, 2002). Going further, one pundit dismissed fears that 
off shoring good US jobs overseas would harm workers:  “the long term tragedy of off shoring 
isn’t that it’s snatching away skilled American jobs but that it isn’t snatching enough of 
them”(Kaihla, 2003).  The Employment Policy Foundation worried that “if current trends 
continue, the labor force will only grow to 165 million by 2030, a shortage of 35 million workers 
… (with) serious consequences, slower growth in the standard of living, change in the balance of 
payments, “wage-push” inflation, … Inequality, persistent structural unemployment.” (Ed Potter, 
Employment Policy Foundation, 2001?).  Seemingly concerned that readers would find the 
claimed shortage dubious in light of their job market experiences, Fortune headlined its report on 
the subject, “Believe It or Not, a Labor Shortage Is Coming” (Fisher, 2003).   
  In this paper, I assess the shortage claims
1 and the labor supply and demand projections 
on which they are based.  I conclude that there is no more reason to believe that the US faces a 
great future labor shortage than that Chicken Little got it right about the sky falling down. The 
retirement of baby boomers and slow growth of the US work force, on which the shortage claims 
are based, will most likely have modest and hard to detect impacts on the job market.  I argue 
that increased supplies of skilled labor in low wage countries will impact US workers more than 
slower increases in domestic labor supply.  If there is to be a great labor shortage in the 
                                                            
1  Economists try to avoid the words shortages and surpluses since in a well-functioning market, prices or wages 
adjust so that buyers and sellers are in equilibrium, with no one wanting to sell or buy more.  One way to interpret 
the wide use of the terms is that they include changes in prices from long run equilibrium values that could have   3 
foreseeable future, it will come from something that the shortage soothsayers ignore – a global 
pandemic that kills millions of people – whose implications would go far beyond assuring that 
business obtains the labor it may seek 10 or 20 years down the road without incurring higher 
wages.  
  My conclusion is based on three findings 
  1. The logic of labor shortage analyses is flawed.  The most dramatic shortage claims 
begin with the premise that labor supply should increase to maintain a fixed rate of growth of 
GDP – a cart before the horse policy from the perspective of standard welfare analysis.  In 
addition, none of the shortage analyses pay adequate attention to the global economy, where the 
supply of low wage educated workers in less developed countries creates a labor surplus 
worldwide, and where other advanced countries are projected to have greater slowdowns in their 
labor supplies than the US. 
  2. Projections of future demands for skills lack the reliability to guide policies on skill 
development.  Demand for labor in detailed occupations has historically been more greatly 
affected by changes in technology or unexpected changes in the composition of output among 
industries than by replacement demand due to retirements.  Globalization makes forecasting skill 
shortages or surpluses in the US or any specific country more difficult than in the past.  
   3. Contrary to the assumption implicit in the shortage analyses, demographic changes 
have not historically been consistently associated with fchanges in labor market conditions, even 
for the young workers whose position is most sensitive to changing market realities.  The 
employment and earnings of young workers depends more on macro-economic conditions, wage 
setting institutions, and technological developments than on demography.  
Dissecting Shortage Claims 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
been avoided if market participants had foreseen the shifts in demand or supply better than they did.    4 
  The most alarmist claims that a great labor shortage is coming assume that the country 
should increase total gross domestic product (GDP) in the future at a rate comparable to the 
growth rate in the recent past.  From 1980 to 2005, US real GDP grew by 3.1 % annually, with 
1.4% due to the growth of labor supply and 1.7% to the growth of labor productivity.  Given 
projected declines in labor force growth to 0.7% per year, the 3.1% growth of GDP will be 
unsustainable absent increases in labor productivity above historical levels.
2 To maintain past 
growth of GDP with 1.7% growth of labor productivity from 2005 to 2030, the US would need 
200 million workers in 2030.  This is 30 million workers short of the projected labor supply. The 
shortfall between the projected growth of the labor force and the growth necessary for 3.1% 
growth of GDP defines the coming labor shortage. 
  The flaw in this mode of thinking is that it treats GDP rather than GDP per capita as the 
touchstone of economic policy, contrary to virtually all analyses of social welfare.  As a wealthy 
country, the US can increase the rate of growth of GDP whenever it wants.  All the US has to do 
is to open the borders to additional immigration.  Labor supply would increase as much as 
desired, raising GDP and returns to capital while reducing wages.  Absent an open borders 
policy, maintaining a desired growth of GDP in the face of slower growth of labor supply 
requires increased labor productivity, which in turn requires additional investment in physical or 
human capital or R&D.  Since growth of GDP depends on all factors of production, we could 
just as well call the likely slower growth of GDP the coming shortage of capital or R&D and 
focus policy on ways to create more capital investment and technological advance as well as 
ways to increase the quality or quantity of labor.    
  If macro-calculations based on maintaining a given growth rate of GDP were the sole 
argument for the coming labor shortage, I doubt whether many economists or business leaders 
                                                            
2  The data on actual changes in GDP and employment are from the Council of Economic Advisors, Economic 
Report of the President 2006, tables A-2 and B-36. The projections are from table 1 of this paper.   5 
would take the claim seriously.  What gives credence to the claim are demographic projections 
that the US work force will grow more slowly than in the past half century or so, with the growth 
concentrated in minority groups that have historically obtained less education and skills than the 
majority population, and a widespread belief that demographic changes have huge discernible 
impacts on the economy.  Shortage analysts fear that a falling growth rate of skilled labor, in 
particular, will produce bottlenecks in production that will reduce growth of GDP per capita.  
Many argue that the country could avoid these problems by preventive investment in education 
and training directed at likely bottleneck or shortage areas.  
  Table 1 examines the magnitude of the projected reduction in the growth of labor supply. 
It shows the number of persons in the US labor force in each decade from 1950 to 2000 and the 
projected labor force from 2000 to 2050; and the absolute change in labor supply from decade to 
decade.  From 1950 to 2000 the labor force grew by 78.7 million persons or 127%.  From 2000 
to 2050, the projected growth of the labor force is 50.9 million persons, or 36%.  This 
deceleration in the rate of growth is expected to be particularly intense from 2010 through 2030, 
when just 12.4 million additional persons are expected to join the labor force.  The reason for 
this timing is the retirement of baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964). 
  The rapid growth of the work force in the 1950s and 1960s came largely from increased 
numbers of woman workers, primarily white women.  In the 1970-1990s growth came from 
immigration and a continued influx of women into the work force.  In the 2000-2050 period 
growth of the work force is expected to come disproportionately from Hispanics and blacks – 
groups with below average education levels. The share of the US population from disadvantaged 
minorities (black, Hispanic, American Indians, Alaska Natives) is projected to rise from 25% in 
2000 to 37% in 2050. 
3 Some analysts worry that the US work force will become less skilled 
                                                            
3 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/natprojtab01a.pdf, table 1, where I estimate the disadvantaged 
minority group as 1 minus the proportion all white non Hispanic , all Asian, and all other races.   6 
unless the country adopts new policies to help these groups improve their educational skills and 
attainment.  In addition, because the US population will be aging, the number of persons in the 
traditional years of retirement will rise relative to the more slowly growing work force, 
burdening the work force to produce sufficient output to pay the retirement income and health 
costs of the aging population.   
The global context 
  If the US was the only country in which the growth of the potential work force was 
projected to decline rapidly or if the US was a closed economic system, with little access to 
workers in other countries, this focus on domestic labor supply to the exclusion of supply 
developments elsewhere might be justifiable.  But in the global economy, demographic 
developments and labor conditions in other countries can affect the US labor market.  
Globalization gives US firms access to labor overseas through foreign direct investment, off 
shoring, or subcontracting and access to foreign-born labor that immigrates to the US.   From this 
perspective, it is incumbent to assess the claims of a coming labor shortage in a global context, 
rather than to treat the US as a closed economy, dependent only on domestic labor to produce 
goods and services. 
  As a first step in placing the shortage projections into a global context, I have examined 
the actual and projected change in the populations of young persons (those aged 18-23) and of 
the 15-59 year olds that make up most of the work force in the US, Western Europe, Japan, and 
China and India (See table 2).  The underlying projections are from the UN, which forecasts an 
aging of the world’s population through 2050, (UN, 2005) and a slowdown in population growth 
in much of the world outside of Africa.  
  The figures in Panel A of table 2 show a drop in the number of persons aged 18-23 in the 
US from 1980 to 2005 and an expected rise in the numbers to 2030 and 2050.  These figures are 
consistent with the slower growth of the work force over time.  But the figures also show that   7 
from 1980 to 2005 the number of young persons in Western Europe and Japan fell more rapidly 
than in the US and will continue to drop thereafter.  In 2050 the US will have 13% more persons 
in this age group than in 2005, whereas Western Europe will have 13% less and Japan 30% less.  
The US share of 18-23 year olds in advanced countries will continue to trend up.   
  But the projected reduction in the supply of young persons is not limited to the advanced 
countries.  Due to the single child policy, the projections for China also show a drop in the 
number of young persons, with the result that the ratio of the number of young Americans to the 
number of young Chinese will increase through 2050.  Even India is projected to have a 
decelerated growth in the number of young people from 2005 to 2030 and a decline thereafter.  
In short, panel A shows that the projected change in the US youth population does not stand out 
as creating an extraordinary shortfall compared to the projected changes in the number of young 
persons in the main countries with which the US is closely tied through the global economy.
4   
  The numbers in Panel B of table 2 for the population aged 15-59 tell a similar story.  The 
increase in the US population in this age bracket drops from 44 million additional persons in 
1975-2000 to 20 million in 2000-2025 and 21 million in 2025 to 2050.  The projected changes in 
Western Europe and Japan are much greater, with the population in this age bracket predicted to 
decline from 2025 to 2050.  The US share of the population in advanced countries will thus keep 
rising. As for the two major highly populous developing countries, China’s population aged 15-
59 is projected to rise through 2025 and then to fall through 2050 while India’s population is 
expected to increase throughout the period. The ratio of the Chinese population to the US 
population will barely change from 2005 to 2050.  The UN projects that the proportion of the 
world’s population in India, Africa, and Latin America will rise.     
The doubling of the global work force 
                                                            
4   The UN projections from which these data are based show a huge increase in the youth population in Africa, 
since the UN does not anticipate a fall in birth rate in that continent to the levels elsewhere.   8 
  In the global economy, where firms “source” labor worldwide, where consumers buy 
goods and services made in countries who are part of the world trading system, and where 
immigrants move among countries, labor developments in one country are likely to affect 
conditions in other countries.  In the 1990s, the global labor market changed greatly when China, 
India, and the ex-Soviet bloc joined the world trading system.  Before then, these countries had 
trade barriers, self-contained capital markets, and only limited immigration to the advanced 
western countries, all of which isolated their labor markets from those in the US or in the rest of 
the capitalist global world. The collapse of Soviet communism, China’s decision to marketize its 
economy, and India’s rejection of autarky, changed all this and brought approximately 1.3 billion 
new workers into the global capitalist system (see figure 1).  Firms in advanced capitalist 
countries could suddenly hire low wage workers in China, India, and the ex-Soviet bloc to do 
work that might previously have been done in advanced countries or in other developing 
countries.  I estimate that this roughly doubled the number of workers in the world economy.  
Most important, because these countries had relatively little capital, their entry into global 
capitalism  reduced the global capital-labor ratio by about 40%, which creates the global 
opposite of the labor shortage projected for the US: an excess of labor at the wages paid in 
advanced countries. This will impact labor markets in the US, in other advanced economies, and 
in other developing countries. Assuming that globalization continues unabated, I expect US firms 
to be able to meet potential shortfalls in domestic labor supplies for tradable goods and services 
by hiring labor overseas, and to seek immigrant labor to ameliorate potential labor shortages in 
the production of non-traded goods or services.  
  If workers in China, India, and the ex-Soviet bloc had the same mix of skills as American 
workers, it would be incontestable that they would compete with American workers and offset if 
not overwhelm any future shortage of US workers.  But workers in these countries do not have 
the same skill set as Americans.  A disproportionate number of Chinese and Indians are peasants   9 
with limited education and relatively have the university training of Americans.  The ex-Soviet 
bloc workers are better educated, but less numerous and suffer from having worked under 
communist conditions.  Perhaps the right way to consider these workers is as complements rather 
than substitutes for American workers, who will increase US demand for educated labor relative 
to less educated labor, and thus create a greater potential shortage of skills in the US. 
  This was, after all, the standard assessment of the impact of globalization on the US when 
the country was debating the NAFTA treaty with Mexico.  Proponents of the treaty argued that 
the US would gain good skilled jobs from increased trade with Mexico while exporting low 
wage less skilled jobs.  This pattern is consistent with the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory, in which comparative advantage is exogenous; and with the principal model that 
economists have used to analyze trade between advanced and developing countries – the “North-
South” model in a dynamic context, where the North (=US and other advanced countries) have a 
comparative advantage in high tech sectors.  The natural policy recommendation from this 
analysis is that US workers should invest more in human capital.  The workers in China, India, 
and other developing countries would never be able to catch up in skills and adversely affect 
educated US workers.  
  This analysis does not seem to characterize the current global labor market.  Developing 
countries, particularly China, are educating their work forces at a rapid pace.   Table 3 shows that 
the US edge in giving university training to its work force declined dramatically from the 1970s 
through the 2000s.  In 1970 approximately 29% of university enrollments worldwide were in the 
US.  By 2000, the US proportion of university enrollments worldwide had fallen to 14%.  
Similarly, at the PhD level, the US share of doctorates produced around the world has fallen 
from about 50% in the early 1970s to a projected level of 15% in 2010.  Some of these trends are 
due to the increased proportion of the world’s population in developing countries, but much is 
due to the spread of mass higher education to most countries.     10 
  One consequence of the increase in the supply of highly educated workers around the 
world is that US multinational firms “globally source for labor” in ways they could not do three 
decades ago.  Another consequence is that the US has been able to meet a large proportion of its 
rising demands for science and engineering workers through immigration.  No readily available 
data set measures the increased proportion of foreign-born highly educated workers employed in 
US multinational around the world, but standard government surveys document the importance 
of immigration of scientists and engineers from overseas.  
  During the 1990s rapid growth of the US economy, the country greatly increased its 
employment of scientists and engineers.  It did so despite fairly constant numbers of graduates in 
these fields among citizens or permanent residents and without markedly raising the salaries of 
these workers.  As table 4 shows, the US was able to meet increased demands for scientists and 
engineers without huge increases in salaries by “importing” foreign born specialists in these 
areas.  Some of the foreign born obtained their education in the US and remained to work in the 
country.  But most of those with BS degrees and roughly half of those with higher degrees 
graduated overseas and came to fill jobs.  If the US economy demands more highly skilled 
workers in the period of projected slow labor force growth, it should be able to increase supplies 
by admitting more immigrants in areas with rising labor demand, as it did in the 1990s.
5    
  Finally, while the National Center for Educational Statistics does not provide long term 
projections of the number of college graduates, master’s or PhDs, the Center’s projections of the 
supply of highly educated workers show continued growth in the numbers of persons through 
2013 (table 5).  In the 1970s-2000s, the growth of the supply of college graduates in the US was 
spurred by a large increase in the proportion of women obtaining degrees.  The proportion of 
young minority persons who obtained bachelors and higher degrees rose as well.  Thus, even 
                                                            
5  From the mid 1990s through early 2000s the US doubled the budget of the National Institute of Health.  This had 
little positive impact on the careers of new US bio-scientists, whose pay remained among the lowest among 
scientists and who had limited career prospects.  One reason was the huge supply of post-docs and graduate students   11 
though the US edge in higher education will undoubtedly continue to diminish -- OECD data 
show that the US no longer leads the world in the proportion of young persons enrolled in higher 
education
6 – several advanced EU countries have higher rates of enrollment than the US – but 
the US will still be producing large and increasing numbers of university graduates.   
occupational/skill demand forecasts  
  Projections of labor shortages require analysts to project labor demands as well as labor 
supplies. To be useful for education and training decisions, the projections must have some skill 
or occupation dimension.  How does the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) project demand for 
labor?  Are those projections sufficiently precise to guide economic policy? 
  Every two years, the BLS’s Office of Occupational Statistics and Employment 
Projections projects the growth of demand in occupations, which it publishes in the Occupational 
Outlook Handbook.  At the heart of the BLS’s occupational projections is an economy-wide 
fixed coefficient input-output model.  This model begins with a set of projections of the growth 
of the major components of final demand for economic outputs; and then uses input-output tables 
to translate the projected growth of final demands into growths of output in different industries.  
The BLS transforms expected outputs into expected levels of employment by industry using 
independent projections of productivity growth by sector.   Finally, it applies coefficients relating 
employment in each occupation to employment in each industry to project the future 
occupational “needs” associated with the expansion or decline in employment in that industry.  
The key to this step are the employment coefficients, which the BLS bases on historical data on 
the employment of workers in a given occupation within an industry, which it adjusts with a 
“change-factor” matrix of likely changes in the utilization of workers with different skills within 
industries.  The BLS gives the example of systems analysts, which it adjusted upward in its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from foreign countries willing to work at low wages in US labs. 
6 National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006.    12 
1990s projections because these workers “would be expected to become a greater proportion of 
each industry' s employment as the number of applications for computer use continues to 
increase.”
7  Finally, the BLS sums the estimates of employment in an occupation by industry 
across all industries to obtain the projected occupational employment. 
8 
   This technique works reasonably well to forecast the growth of highly aggregated 
occupations in periods when the economy does not undergo any dramatic changes and when 
technological change does not greatly alter the demand for skills.  It also works well for detailed 
occupations where most persons work in the same industry and where productivity growth and 
final demands are reasonably stable.  In its assessment of the 1984-95 projections, the BLS 
reports that they “captured the majority of the general trends ... (with) the most glaring 
inaccuracies in the projections of detailed occupations reflect(ing) the conservative nature of 
projected growth rates;”
9 and that the principal source of projection error was unexpected 
changes in the intra-industry utilization of different occupations.  For instance, the 1984-95 
projections were highly accurate for cooks in institutions or cafeterias (18.0% projected growth 
of employment vs 18.1% actual growth) but under predicted  the growth of child care workers, 
personnel, training, and labor relations specialists, radiological technologists, and various 
computer specialties, among other occupations.  Unfortunately projections that are reasonably 
accurate for occupations with relatively stable employment but which fail to foresee big changes 
in demands for occupations that are likely to involve new skills are of limited value in assessing  
future “shortages.” 
  My analysis of the accuracy of BLS projections of employment, based on a regression 
model that links actual changes in occupational employment to the projected changes for the 
                                                            
7  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Projections and Training Data, 2004-05 Edition, chapter 2, page 42 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/optd/optd002.pdf 
8  See Daniel Hecker, Occupational Employment Projections to 2014, Monthly Labor Review, November, 2005, 
volume 128, no 11.  
9 Carolyn Veneri, “Evaluating the 1995 occupational employment projections,” Monthly Labor Review, September   13 
period 1988 to 2000, tell a similar story.  The regression model effectively puts errors in 
projecting the overall growth of employment into the constant term in the regression and thus 
focuses on the ability of the projections to differentiate employment growth among occupations. 
My model takes the change in the ln of actual employment as the dependent variable and the ln 
difference between projected employment and actual employment as the independent variable, 
which focuses on relative changes.  Figure 2 summarizes the main result.  It shows first that the 
projected growth rates are positively related to ensuing growth of employment, though with a 
wide band of variation. The estimated constant term is near zero, implying that the projections 
accurately captured the overall growth of employment.  The regression coefficient on the 
projected ln change term is 0.93, only modestly below unity.   This implies that on average an 
occupation where employment is projected to grow or decline by 10% grows or declines at about 
9.3%.  The problem is in the fit of the equation.  The R
2 is just 0.26, so that 3/4s of the variation 
in the growth of employment among occupations remains unaccounted for in the analysis.  The 
figure displays this with a wide range of actual growth rates for any predicted growth rate.  
Given the variance in the growth of occupations, the standard error for the ln employment 
growth predicted by the regression is a relatively high 0.30.   
  There are three reasons why the projections have a high standard error.  First, the industry 
mix of output or employment can change in unexpected ways due to changing technology or 
market conditions.  In the global economy, a given demand that domestic producers once met by 
hiring US workers can be met by foreign competitors, while some other domestic sector may 
expand to meet foreign demands.  Changes like these are not well captured in the input-output 
model.  Second, technical change alters the coefficients of occupational employment within 
industries in ways that are difficult to predict.  Third, the input-output framework ignores 
substitutions in factor usage due to changes in factor prices.  It does not allow for employers to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1997, p 15.   14 
substitute against occupations with rapidly rising wages or for occupations where wages are 
falling (Freeman, 1980).  By focusing solely on demand adjustments, the projection model 
ignores possible supply responses to market conditions that can greatly affect input coefficients 
(in principle through the effect of supply on wages).   
An example: computer and mathematical sciences  
  Because demand for computer specialists has changed greatly (motivating the BLS’s 
adjusting the input coefficients for systems analysts mentioned above) it is particularly insightful 
to examine the projections of employment in this area.  The BLS has published projections of 
future employment in “computer and mathematical sciences” every two years between 1996 and 
2002.  In each projection, the BLS took as its base actual employment in the year and projected 
employment ten years into the future.   
  Table 6 summarizes the projections.  In 1996, BLS projected that over the next decade 
employment would double from 1.0 million jobs to 2 million jobs – a growth of 100,000 
additional jobs per year.  But at the height of the dot.com and high tech boom of the late 1990s, 
labor supply increased far more rapidly than the BLS expected.  By 1998, just two years after the 
BLS projected a growth of employment of 100,000 per year, 1.7 million persons worked as 
computer and mathematical scientists – an annual growth of 350,000 employed persons in the 
area.  Since universities were not graduating those numbers of specialists, the supply came from 
persons from other disciplines shifting into the computer occupations in response to a booming 
job market.  Starting its 1998 projection at 1.7 million, the BLS projected a 92% growth of 
employment to 2008 – 1.5 million additional jobs.  But in 2000, national statistics showed 3 
million computer and mathematical scientists – 50% more than the BLS had projected for 2006 
four years earlier.  Given the rapid growth of employment, the BLS raised its projected 
employment to 5 million by 2010. Then came the dot.com collapse and the off shoring of 
computer jobs to India and other low wage countries.  The 2002 projection reduced the expected   15 
number a decade into the future to 4.1 million – an 18% drop in projected employment compared 
to the 2000 projection for 2010.   
  The wide variation in the number of workers projected in computer and mathematical 
sciences reflects the difficulty in foreseeing future demands in an occupation subject to volatile 
demand from different economic factors.  First, there was the expansion of computer work in the 
US market and the huge supply response to new job opportunities. Then came the growing 
availability of qualified labor overseas, which allowed firms to offshore work.  Over the entire 
period employment of computer and mathematical scientists rose sharply, but the market 
fluctuates so much that new graduates in some cohorts had difficulty finding work while 
experienced programmers and computer specialists could not obtain the type of jobs they 
expected.  In 2000 programmers had an unemployment rate that was among the lowest in the 
country – 1.7% compared to a rate for all workers of 3.9%.  But in 2001 the rate of 
unemployment of programmers tripled to 5.1% to exceed the national rate, and remained high in 
succeeding years.
10 
Demography and replacement demand     
But the projected labor shortage in the US comes from a presumably well-determined 
demographic projection based on the retirement of the baby boom generation, rather than from 
detailed projections of demand for specialized workers with wide confidence band.  It is natural 
to think that the coming retirement of the large baby boom generation in the US will inevitably 
create job openings and predictable “replacement demand” for new workers.  If an occupation 
has 100 55 yr olds working in 2010 and these workers retire at 65 in 2020, and if nothing else 
changes employers would seek 100 new workers to replace the retirees. If there is any part of a 
projection of future labor market balances that would seem likely to prove accurate, projecting 
replacement demand would be it.   16 
This expectation is wrong.  Enough other things change, which labor market models only 
imperfectly capture, to make projections of replacement demands more complicated and suspect.  
Changes in retirement behavior – the move to early retirement in that latter part of the 20
th 
century and possible moves to delayed retirement to increase the solvency of social security – 
can readily cause divergences between predictions based solely on aging and actual retirements. 
  In making its projections of replacement demands for labor, the BLS differentiates 
between total separations from an occupation, defined as the flow of individuals leaving an 
occupation; and net separations, defined to include movements of workers into as well as out of 
an occupation over a specific period.  In the retirement age group, the two concepts are similar 
since few workers will enter an occupation in that age group from another occupation, but they 
can differ considerably for younger age groups and across occupations, some of which may 
traditionally obtain experienced workers from other occupations and others of which 
traditionally send workers to other occupations.  An additional complication occurs between 
occupations where employment is expected to rise or to fall.  For occupations in which 
employment has been rising, the BLS estimates net separation rates, by age, to estimate 
replacement needs during the projection period, but it cannot use this procedure for occupations 
where employment is expected to decline.
11 
   To assess the relation between replacement demand and future job availability for 
workers of less than retirement age, I estimated a regression model linking employment in an 
occupation in 2000 in different age groups to the number of  employed persons 55 and over in 
the occupation in 1990 – likely retirees over the decade – and to the number of persons in the age 
group in 1990.   If replacement demands were important in creating jobs for workers below 
retirement age, the number of persons 55 and over working in 1990 would be positively related 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10  See NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, appendix table 3-8.   
11 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Projections and Training Data, 2004-05 Edition, chapter 4  
http://www.bls.gov/emp/optd/optd005.pdf7   17 
to the number of workers in younger age groups in the occupation in 2000.  To give equal weight 
to large and smaller occupations, I scaled the variables by total employment in each occupation 
in 1990, so that each variable is in a rate form.   The second explanatory variable, the number of 
persons in the specified age group in 1990, again scaled by employment in the occupation in 
1990, is designed to deal with the likelihood that some occupations naturally have more or fewer 
workers in different age groups.  With this held fixed, replacement demand should show up in 
additional employment in that age group.   
  Table 7 gives the regression coefficients and standard errors and related statistics for this 
model.  The results reject the notion that the rate of likely retirement in an occupation is 
associated with growth of employment for persons in younger age groups.  The coefficients on 
the relative number of persons in the retirement age group are essentially zero for the 16-24 year 
olds and for the 45-54 year olds and are negative significant for persons in the other two age 
groups.  In these simple calculations, replacement demand for workers in given occupations is 
negatively rather than positively related to the numbers hired.  Why?  
   The most plausible reason is that older workers tend to be concentrated in older 
economic sectors, from which demand is shifting toward newer areas.  It is this factor that 
induces the BLS to give different replacement demands for growing and declining occupations.  
In the 1990s there were many workers of retirement age in the railroad industry and in heavy 
manufacturing, but few in the new computer software and e-economy sectors where employment 
was growing.  If labor economists had a model that fully accounted for changes in employment 
due to all factors, replacement demand would inevitably have a positive impact on employment 
of younger persons, but absent such a model, the effects of replacement demand are so dwarfed 
by changes in market conditions as to produce the negative relations in table 6.  The message is 
that economic forecasters should not count on replacement demand for retiring baby boomers to 
create a labor shortage in the occupations with lots of boomers.    18 
demography and labor market developments 
  Implicit in the fears that the US will face a great labor shortage in the next decade or two 
is a belief that demographic forces have a powerful predictable impact on economic outcomes. In 
the past, this has not been the case.  Changes in behavior due to changing market incentives often 
overwhelm demographic factors.   In the 1950s and 1960s analysts projected much smaller 
growth in labor supply than actually occurred because they failed to foresee the changing labor 
force behavior of women in response to improved employment opportunities and wages.  In the 
late 1960s-early 1970s, when the baby boom generation reached the job market, the earnings and 
employment of young persons worsened relative to the earnings and employment of older 
workers due to the demographically driven shift in labor supplies.  Indeed, this shift was an 
econometrician’s dream exogenous shock for estimating the elasticity of the wages of young 
persons relative to older persons to changes in relative supplies (Freeman, 1979; Welch 1979).  
But when the number of young entrants fell in ensuing years, the earnings and employment of 
the new smaller cohorts of young workers did not improve.  The OECD, among others, expected 
Western Europe’s youth unemployment problems to disappear over time as the supply of young 
persons fell. Instead, other factors, such as national wage policies that affected young workers 
and the state of the macro-economy dominated the youth labor market (Blanchflower and 
Freeman, 2000).  In the early 1970s I projected that the rapidly growing supply of graduates 
would create a long run relative surplus of college graduates, albeit around cobweb fluctuations 
(Freeman, 1976). Indeed, relative pay of graduates fell in the early and mid 1970s and then 
picked up as the growth of supply diminished.  But in the ensuing decade relative demand for 
graduates began growing more rapidly than relative supply to produce a rising wage gap between 
more and less educated workers. 
  As a final point of caution about forecasting economic developments from supply-based 
projections, consider the slow growth of the labor force in advanced Europe and Japan in the   19 
1990s through the mid 2000s.  The demography implied that these countries would develop 
major labor shortages, but they did not.  The problem in EU labor markets was quite the 
opposite: high unemployment and low employment to population rates.  Perhaps the US 
economy is so different from those of advanced Europe that the slow projected growth of labor 
supply in the US will produce shortages, but perhaps not.  The lesson from the historical record 
is that there is a huge gap between demographic changes and ensuing economic developments. 
conclusion 
  If the analysis of this paper is correct and the economic sky will not fall down in the face 
of a slower growth in the US work force, why have so many persons concerned with the well 
being of the US economy warning about the great coming labor shortage?   
  I suspect that three factors are at work.   
  The first is that many of those concerned about the possible future shortage do not realize 
the historically large gap between demographic developments and economic developments nor 
recognize that globalization will further widen that gap.  
  The second reason is that fears of a coming shortage fit with the concerns of various 
groups.  Future shortage or not, business will benefit from policies that increase labor supply to 
drive down labor costs.  Advocates of education and training see the shortage analysis as a way 
to gain national support for increased spending on training that will benefit workers.  Politicians 
can use the shortage analysis to avoid dealing with policies like minimum wages, mandated 
health care spending, labor law reform, or enforcement of labor laws, and the like, by endorsing 
“win-win” education and training policies while sidestepping the fact that someone must pay for 
these investments.    
  The third reason that I believe the shortage analysis appeals to some is that it offers a 
more optimistic framework for analyzing the economic future than the view that the biggest 
problem facing US workers is competition from low wage labor overseas is.  If the doubling of   20 
the global work force has weakened the position of workers in the US, the country has to deal 
with issues regarding the rules of the global economy, ways to increase savings and the supply of 
capital, ways to retain good jobs and sectors and to distribute the gains from globalization to 
labor as well as capital while deterring protectionism. 
  That the coming labor shortage is more myth than reality does not invalidate some of the 
policies that shortage analysts endorse to help the economy progress.  More and better schooling 
and job training and greater provision of occupational information are potentially critical to the 
nation’s preserving comparative advantage in high tech sectors under the global competition 
vision of the future.  There is arguably greater need for those policies if global competition 
places downward pressure on US workers than if a domestic labor shortage puts them in the 
catbird seat in the economy and places business under pressure to recruit more workers.   
  Finally, if my analysis is wrong and the US develops a great labor shortage in the future, 
I do not see why the government should intervene to prevent labor costs from rising.  If firms 
demand more labor than workers supply due to a reduced growth of supply, should not a country 
that relies extensively on unfettered markets allow those markets to raise the price of labor, just 
as it allowed them to reduce the pay of many in recent decades?  There is nothing in economics 
that predicts “slower growth in the standard of living, change in the balance of payments, 
inequality, persistent structural unemployment,” or any other economic disasters from the normal 
functioning of competitive markets in the face of a shift in the supply-demand balance.  If there 
is going to be a great labor shortage that raises wages and benefits for American workers, should 
we not all cheer the workings of the Invisible Hand, rather than seeing this as a disaster that 
policy should seek to avoid?     21 
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Table 1: Labor supply, 1950 to 2000 and Projected Labor supply, 2000-2050 
 
 
  Labor Supply  Change      
  in millions        In millions 
1950      62.2        -- 
1960      69.6                  7.4 
1970      82.8                 13.2 
1980    106.9                 24.1 
1990    125.8                 18.9 
2000   140.9      15.1 
2010    157.7      16.8 
2020  164.7        7.0 
2030  170.1                   5.4 
2040    180.5                 10.4 
2050  191.8                 11.3 
 
Source, 2000 to 2050, Toossi, MLR, May 2002, table 5;  
1950-1990, http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/02HS0029.xls 
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Table 2:  Trends in population aged 18-23 and 15-59 
   
a) Population aged 18-23  
 
    US    Western  Japan        China    India          US Share of Advanced 
      Europe          
1980    26.2  16.3  9.5         109.5     78.1    50% 
2005              25.4  13.6   8.7          127.3   125.2    53% 
2030    28.3     11.7  6.9           102.6    139.6    60% 
2050              28.8     11.9  6.1           88.6   121.3    62% 
 
b) Population aged 15-59 
 
1975    132   99  71  497  335    44% 
2000    176  113  79  829  594    48% 
2025    196  100  65  913  869    54% 
2050    217   86  49  787  939    62% 
 
Source: Panel A, National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, 
appendix table 2-36 
  Panel B.  UN Population Division, DESA, World Population Ageing 1950-2050 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/index.htm   26 
 
 
Table 3: US share of highly educated workers, 1970 -2000 and 2010   
 
US share of college enrollments 
  1970      30% 
  2000      14% 
 
US share of science and engineering PhDs 
  1975      40% 
  2010      15% 
 
Source: Freeman, 2006   27 
 
       
Table 4: Huge Supplies Outside US Raise Foreign-born shares of Scientists 
and Engineers 
 
    1990  2000 
Bachelor’s   11%  17% 
Master’s   19%  29% 
PhD     24%  38% 
   PhDs <45  27%  52% 
   Post-docs  51%  60% 
 
Source: Freeman, 2005   28 
 
 
Table  5: College Graduate Supply in thousands, 1988, 2001, and Projected 2014 
 
        Associate Bachelor’s      Master’s    PhD    First Professional 
1988-89       299           1019        311            36          71 
 
2002-03      633    1348    513         46          81 
 
2013-14      735    1582    693         55         101   
 
Source: Hussar, 2005, figure G, pp 13-14   29 
 




Year in which   Actual Number       Year    Projected Number   New Jobs 
BLS made Projection  In projection yr    Projected 
1996      1.0 M             2006      2.0 M    1.0    98% 
1998      1.7 M                 2008          3.2 M    1.5    92% 
2000      3.0 M                 2010      5.0 M    2.0    67% 
2002      3.0 M                      2012      4.1 M    1.1    34% 
 
Source: Projections made in  
1996, Silvestri, George T.“Occupational Employment Projections to 2006” 
  MLR, November, 1997, pp  58-83  
1998 Braddock, Douglas, “Occupational Employment Projections to 2008” 
  MLR, November, 1999, pp 51-77 
2000, Hecker, Daniel E. “Occupational Employment Projections to 2010” 
  MLR, November, 2001, pp 57-84 
2002  Hecker, Daniel E. “Occupational Employment Projections to 2012” 
  MLR, February  2004, pp 80-104 
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Table 7:  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for relation between relative number 
employed aged 55 and over in 1990 and relative numbers of persons in younger age groups 
in 2000                               
 
                                              Age groups in 2000,      
  16-24  25-34  35-44  45-54 
  Relative 
number of 










 Relative number 
of persons in 
specified age 









Constant  .00  .21  .28  .21 
R
2  .63  .07  .02  .02 
Number of 
observations 
473  473  473  473 
     
Note: All variables are scaled relative to total employment in an occupation in 1990. Data from  
Bureau of Labor Statistics Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, and age, Annual 
Average 1990 and 2000 (based on CPS)   31 
Figure 1:  The Effect of China, India, and the ex-Soviet bloc on the global labor supply, circa 
2000, measured in millions of workers 
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-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Actual ln change = .00+   .93 (0.09) Pred ln change R2 = 0.26
Std Deviation of actual change 0.34; Std Error of regression 0.30
N= 338   
 
Source: tabulated using BLS data on actual and predicted employment, 1988-2000 
Annual industry and occupation, and Employment persons by detailed occupation and major 
industry, Annual Average 2000 (based on CPS), 
 
 